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Abstract 
It seems to be a cornmon-place enough statement to note that language depends on con- 
text. For example, under the notion of deixis, certain linguistic structures (i.e., deictics like 
I, here, or now) show a dependence on context that is thought to be essential. However, 
the relationship between language and context is far from clear and has been the centre of 
a debate which has gained mornenturn over the past ten years. The controversy begins 
with the question of how much in language and which parts of it are context-dependent, 
but it also, and perhaps more s~bstant ial l~,  includes the question of how the relationship 
between language and context should be conceptualized in more theoretical terms. In this 
paper, 1 will follow some lines of argument of this debate. 1 will start with the traditional 
notion of context-in-language and show that it is too restrictive by listing linguistic struc- 
tures beyond deixis which must be interpreted with reference to context in order to be 
understood properly. 1 will also give a typology of contextual elements (Le., co-textual fea- 
tures, physical surroundings of the speech situation, social situation, participants common 
background knowledge and the channel or mediurn) which may play a role in understand- 
ing. In the second part of the paper, 1 will deal with the context-text link and 1 will try to 
show that the notion of contextualization is superior to that of context-Apendence to account 
in an adequate theoretical and empirical way for this link. 
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1. Preliminaries 
What is to be considered a context and what the text (mote genetally, thefocal 
event or the object of participanti attention') which the context surrounds, is 
a question that cannot be decided on the basis of objective facts since observables 
do not neatly categorize themselves under these two labels. Instead, seeing 
something as a foca1 event and other things as its context is already an inter- 
pretation of the perceived stimuli in somebody's environment. 
In otder to underline the perceptual and interpretive character offocal 
events and contexts, it has been proposed to conceive of them in terms of a fi- 
pre-ground relati~nship.~ Focal events as figures are perceived according to 
Goodwin and Duranti (1992) as «well outlined, sharply defined, and well arti- 
culated)), while contexts as gounds «appear far more arnorphous, problematic, 
and less stable)). 
Another metaphot well suited to highlight the interpretive aspect of the 
notion of context is Husserl's horizon (Sinnh~rizont)~ where the meaning of 
any event or thing cannot be understood by someone who does not properly 
take into account its horizon. The horizon itself dissolves as soon as we attempt 
to describe or analyze it; for anyone who tries to reach the horizon will only 
find himself in another situation which opens up yet another horizon as far 
out of reach as the original one. 
Both the figurelground and the horizon metaphor hold true for lay iden- 
tification offocal events against their background or context, just as well as fot 
linguistic theories, which usually work out the details of the linguistic datum 
(thejgure), but gloss over the context (the ground in which it is embedded 
andlor from which it receives its particular interpretation. Any attempt to 
move a part of the ground or horizon into the focus of attention will necessa- 
rily have to see this focus against another gound or horizon in which it is now 
embedded, and so on. 
2. The traditional point of view deWs in language 
Linguistic theories of context may be categorized along three dimensions: 
(a) according to the aspects of context believed to be relevant for a pragmatic 
analysis of language (henceforth called the indexed features), (b) according to 
the aspects of language believed to be subject to a context-bound interpretation 
or meaning-assignment (henceforth called indexicals), and finally, (c) according 
to the type of relationship which is believed to hold between the first and the 
second. Although these three dimensions are theoretically independent from 
each other, certain triples of indexed features, indexicals and conceptualiza- 
tions of the relationship between the two have established themselves in the 
1. The term is borrowed from Goodwin and Duranti (1992). 
2. Goodwin and Duranti (1992: 10) and following pages. 
3. Compare with Gadamer (196011972: 286 and following pages). 
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history of the discipline. A particularly important triple consists in some fea- 
ture of the physical surroundings here-and-now, such as speaker, hearer, time 
and place (egoltu, hic, nunc) as the indexed feature; some deictic elements 
of a language (such as here, l o r  now) as the indexicals (denotational indexi- 
cal), and a unidirectional relationship between the two (i.e., the context deter- 
mines the meaning of the linguistic utterance). These three dimensions have 
come to be associated with what could have been called representational the- 
ories of language. 
The triple represents the most narrow theory/theories of context in lin- 
guistics, but also the onels that has received most attention. One reason is that 
the relevance of context is confined to restricted areas of grammar from which 
it can be expelled by proper paraphrase. Schneider (1993) speaks of the semanti- 
zation of pragmatics in this case, consisting in a translation of relevant aspects 
of context into expressions of the object language, which is then subject to 
non-pragmatic, or truth value semantics. A second reason has to do with the 
fact that only those linguistic utterances which cannot be assigned referential 
meaning unless their context-of-occurrence is taken into account are seen to be 
in need of a pragmatic analysis. Non-referential aspects of meaning are exclu- 
ded; linguistic indexicals for these aspects of meaning are neglected. A third 
consideration is that the relevant indexed elements are looked upon as real 
world objects out there, to which deictic structures refer. As a consequence, 
context features are regarded as existent prior to and independent of speakers' 
linguistic activities in or relative to them. The in~ompatibilit~ of such a notion 
of context with the above-mentioned Gestalt approach is obvious.* 
3. Context-bound linguistic elements beyond deixis: some exarnples 
One way to show that the previous approach to context is restrictive is by enu- 
merating linguistic structures other than deictic expressions in their denota- 
tional function, which nevertheless index entities outside the &cal event. What 
immediately comes to mind here are systems of honorifics which, in many 
languages, relate to participants' social roles; here, we may include structurally 
simple systems such as forms of address or the TUIVOS pronominal dis- 
tinction, but also elaborate systems such as those of Japanese or Javanese, which 
affect major parts of the grammar and lexicon. In this case of what is some- 
times misleadingly5 called social deixis, it is not a denotatum in the real world 
out there which is indexed, but rather a perceived social relationship between 
4. For a thorough critique of the narrow approach to context, the reader is referred to Schneider 
(1993), and Silverstein (1976, 1992). According to Silverstein, the privileged position of the 
narrow conscrual of context in linguistics is related to (and even a consequence 00 
the semiotically based limits of [speakersy awareness which biases their metalinguistic abili- 
ties towards referential, segmental, and maximally creative features of language. 
5. The term is misleading if the notion of deixis is restricted to a denotational or referential in- 
dexical. 
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the speaker and the addressee, or the referent, or of al1 three. But, of course, 
not only honorifics are chosen relative to social role relationships. Variationists 
and interactional s~ciolin~uists as well as linguistic anthr~~ologists have accu- 
mulated evidence for the claim that variation permeates grammar, from pho- 
netics up to turn-taking; this variation (including its ideological underpinning 
as part of a habitus in the sense of Bourdieu 1977) is partly an index of speak- 
ers' and recipients' social categories, and of the social relationship that holds 
between them. The selection of a variety from a repertoire - be it a style, regis- 
ter, dialect, vernacular, or language (code-switching) is subject to the same 
complex of context variables. 
Another large area of linguistic structure which eschews the narrow rea- 
ding of context-dependence may be subsumed under the heading of subjec- 
tivity.' Contrary to the narrow reading of context in which speakers enter only 
to the degree that they fix the here-now-and-there for denotational action, the 
impact of the speaking subject under this view extends to how his or her life- 
world, likes and dislikes, identification with persons or events referred to, is 
reflected in and indexed by syntax and morphology, lexicon and prosody. This 
is particularly clear in the case ofwhat Jakobson (1971) has called evidentials, 
which are the grammatical or morphological means by which a speaker sig- 
nals his or her commitment to the truth of a statement (e.g., the Turkish dubi- 
tativeverbal affixes). In addition, work by Kuno (1987:203ff) and others has 
demonstrated how the selection of certain syntactic constructions (such as pas- 
sives, subordination, sentence mood) and lexical items (certain reciprocal verbs, 
certain verbs of motion, and so on) can be explained by reference to the speak- 
er's empathy. The function of prosody, particularly intonation, to display 
the speaker's point of view has been acknowledged since the beginnings of 
modern linguistics (arnong many others, Voloshinov 19261 1976). Only recently 
has it been shown that this expression of subjectivity in language is not indi- 
vidualistic and unstructured, but follows recurrent, conventionalized patterns.7 
In addition to the speaker's point of view, grammatical structure also depends 
on and indicates the recipient'spoint of vieW pragmatic distinctions such as 
the one between given and new information or that between theme and rheme, 
which have been shown to be central for word order and other syntactic phe- 
nomena such as left- and right-dislocations, capitalize on precisely this aspect 
of context. 
Finally, syntax is an index to co-participants' shared background know- 
ledge. Fillmore, Kay, and O'Connor (1988) have demonstrated this link in 
their analysis of the conjunction let alone (e.g., I wouldn't hire Smith, let alone 
Jones), which construes a scalar model of interpretation in which the second 
proposition expresses the answer to a factual or hypothetical question, but the 
6. The term aludes to Benveniste's (1958) subjectivitédam le langage. Present-day terms would 
be empathy, perspective or point of view. 
7. Compare with recent work by Günthner (1996), Selting (1994) on the prosody of indig- 
nation, vidiculing, expressive assessments and similar emotional aspects of language. 
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first proposition establishes some point of comparison, which by presuppo- 
sed common knowledge is superior to the second. Without the knowledge 
that Smith is quite an alcoholic, and Jones even more so, the conjunction could 
not be understood correctly. The same argument can be made for other parts 
of syntax. 
Dependence on shared knowledge is also found in the structure of the lexi- 
con, where single lexical items point to others to which they are bound by cul- 
tural convention and with which they form a semantic field (Trier 1934). In 
the famous mini-story The baby cried, the mommy picked it up discussed by 
Sacks (1972), a correct understanding is only possible when mommy/baby, but 
also mommylpick up and babylcriedare seen as parts of a frame-like whole, such 
that mentioning one of them activates the other, or the first (category-mem- 
ber) activates the second (catego y-bound activity), respectively. The effectiveness 
and elegance of the working of such a membership categorizdtion device depends 
on knowledge about the set-up of afdmily; in a culture in which only grand- 
parents take care of the children, its interpretation would be quite different 
from what it is in a Western cultural context.* 
The few examples given here may be sufficient to show that the relevance 
of contextual factors for the understanding of linguistic structures is not res- 
tricted to the case of deixis. When we move from grammar and lexicon to a 
broader (and indeed, prapatic) conception of language as social action, this 
relevance becomes even less disputable.9 It is here that the semantization of 
pragmatics has failed in particularly obvious ways. Early attempts to describe 
the meaning of speech acts by relating them to underlying performative verbs 
are generally dismissed as misleading and inadequate today. The meaning of an 
utterance qua social activity (Handlungj cannot be reduced to a speaker's men- 
tal state (intention) to perform such an activity; nor can it be dealt with by the 
semantic description of a peformative verb which seems to correspond to this 
mental state. Instead, it is the joint achievement of both the speaker and his 
or her recipientls, to make an utterance meaningfiil in its context-of-occu- 
rrence. In Voloshinov's words, such an activity is not simply fit into, the result 
of, or caused by its context: it resolves it (192611976: 100; also compare with 
his materialistic notion of dialogue, Voloshinov 19271 197 1). 
The most radical alternative to the semanticizing approach to context has 
been formulated by ethnomethodologists (Garfinkel 1967) who assume the 
indexicality of any linguistic (or other) activity to be obstinately unavoidable 
and irremediable, whatever remedial actions investigators may engage in 
(Garfinkel and Sacks 1970: 349). Although lay members -or professionals- 
may, for some reason and for some purpose, formulate parts of an interaction, 
(i.e., they may say-in-so-many-words-what-we-are-doingj, these accounts them- 
8. Compare with Bilrnes (1993) for lexical and grarnmatical implicature from an ethnometh- 
odological point of view. 
9. As an early transition from the semanticizing to the pragrnatic point of view, note Benveniste's 
(1970) notion of énonciation . 
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selves display indexical features; in this way, context becomes relevant at different 
hierarchical levels of (meta-)linguistic action, but it can never be expelled from 
it. Accounts are always informed by their occasions of use. 
4. Which contexts? A preliminary srpology 
If we are willing to accept a wide notion of context, it is useful to distinguish 
types of indexed entities in order to come to grips with the complexity of the 
signlcontext interface.'' In a pre-theoretical, but intuitively plausible way, five 
dimensions of context suggest themselves: (a) linguistic contexts (sometimes 
called co-texts), (b) non-linguistic sense-data in the surroundings of the lin- 
guistic activity (the situation in a physical sense), (c) features of the social situa- 
tion, (d) features of participants' common background knowledge other than 
(a)-(c), and (e) the channel of communication (the medium). 
Links lbetween a linguistic sign and its co-textual features have been tho- 
roughly studied as means for establishing textual cohesion (Halliday and Hasan 
1976); here, anaphoric and cataphoric pro-forms play a decisive role." The 
long-standing linguistic interest in these textual functions may be a conse- 
quence of the fact that the linguistic means employed for them overlap con- 
siderably with those used for deixis.12 Another fundamental co-textual feature 
is the sequencing of conversational act(ivitie)s. Research in conversation analy- 
sis has shown that conversational activities (moves) prestructure (to different 
degrees) the following conversational slot with respect to speaker as well as 
activity selection. While adjacen ypairs represent a particularly strong kind of 
sequential link, other activities (e.g., first parts in action chains) leave more 
alternatives for the sequentially next activity open.13 
In the case of cohesion, as well as in that of conversational sequencing, 
foca1 events are related to their co-texts by a relationship of (immediate or 
mediate) adjacency on the same hierarchical level of text structure. What repre- 
sents a co- text for a given linguistic sign may also be located on a superordinate 
level of linguistic structure. This is the case when utterances are parts of lar- 
ger speech activities, speech events, or genres. These larger events will then pro- 
vide the context for thefocal event, which is embedded in them. For instance, 
10. Various proposals have been made to list the different components of those aspects of con- 
text that may be relevant for language. Del1 Hymes' SPEAKING acronym has been one of 
the most influential ones (Hymes 1972); other influential ones are given by Halliday (e.g., 
Halliday and Hasan 1985, Blom and Gumperz 1972, more recently also by Goodwin and 
Duranti 1992 and Auer 1992). The selection and discussion of context types is necessarily 
restricted here to the most fundamental ones. 
11. O f  course, it is well known that anaphoric and cataphoric links between full forms and 
pro-forms are not always based on referential continuity. 
12. For a discussion of the difference between deixis and anaphora, see Ehlich (1982). Ir should 
be noted that the parallel treatment of anaphora and cataphora is indicative of a planar, 
non-linear (and basically literate) visualization of language as a non-temporal, textual form. 
13. See Schegloff and Sacks (1973), or Pomerantz (1975). 
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an utterance may be co-textually embedded as an orientation to a rtory. In this 
case, the superordinate co-text informs the organization and interpretation 
of the subordinate one, just as the latter contributes and, in a way, helps to 
achieve the first. 
A final component of co-text which brings us to the fringes of the linguistic 
dimension of context is given by the intertextual relationship between texts 
produced on different occasions. Following Bakhtin (1986), it is well known 
that texts often (or, in some theories, always) respond to prior texts, and, at 
the same time, anticipate subsequent ones. Indeed, some linguists have pro- 
posed seeing context as yet another collection of texts indexed by the foca1 
text. While Bakhtin's notion of intertextuality includes sequentiality in the 
sense of conversation analysis, the more interesting aspect of intertextuality 
refers to distant text relationships across situations. Here, texts may relate to 
actual other texts by referring or quoting them; or they may index prior tra- 
ditions of formal structures in text production, as in the case of re-uses or adap- 
tations, changes or amalgamations of one or various genres (Briggs and 
Baumann 1992).14 
The second dimension of context is given by the physical surroundings 
of the speech situation, (Le., the things and events in the co-partici ants' sen- 
sual, particularly visual, reach). Everything that can be pointed to,lPinc1uding 
time, may become an indexed feature of a deictic expression. The second 
dimension of context therefore seems to be directly linked to the narrow cons- 
trual of context. There is, however, an alternative tradition to this rather sta- 
tic approach to the situational environment of speech: Malinowski (1926) first 
drew linguist-ethnographers' attention to a language that does not have the 
dignity of many written texts (i.e., being detached from the social activities of 
everyday life) but which is part of a stream of verbal and non-verbal activities, 
both of which are intertwined and depend on each other for their interpreta- 
tion. His famous description of the Trobriand islanders coming back into the 
lagoon after a fishing expedition gives an example of such hnguage in action 
(where the in refers both literally and idiomatically to action). Here, the verbal 
components of the situation as it develops in time are certainly not autono- 
mous; and their relationship to the context-of-situation is far more intricate 
than could be analyzed on the basis of deixis alone. In fact, the verbal com- 
ponents are often only secondary -les essential to, less constitutive of the 
action than the non-verbal ones. Nevertheless, they may take on decisive impor- 
tance at some points. Bühler (1 934: 154ff), who elaborated on this empractic 
use of language from a more linguistic perspective in his analysis of rituatio- 
14. For further reading on the link benveen intertextuality and the construction of discourses, 
see Fairclough (1992). 
15. To  speak ofpointingin this case obviously requires a rather loose usage of the term, inclu- 
ding metaphoricai extensions not present in everyday language. Since Bühler (1934), poin- 
ting gestures such as the voice of the speaker, eye-movements or body orientation are 
accepted parts of deixis. 
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nal ellipsis (~resumabl~ without knowing Malinowski's work), aptly calls them 
diacritics on non-verbal activities. 
As a third dimension of context, the social situation was mentioned. It 
includes the constellation of participants, their social roles and the social acti- 
vity they are engaged in. The analysis of the different alignments a co-partici- 
pant may establish with a particular linguistic utterance (i.e., his or her 
participant role) is one of the main topics in Goffman's work. For Goffman, a 
socialsituation is an environment of mutual monitoringpossibilities within a gath- 
ering (1964: 135). Within such a social situation, it is not enough to distin- 
guish speaker and hearer, as used to be done in the traditional, cybernetically 
based models of communication. Instead, Goffman distinguishes, on the pro- 
duction side, between an animator who is the sound box for the message, an 
authorwho is responsible for its wording, and aprincipal apariy to whoseposi- 
tion the wordr attest (Goffman 1979). On the reception side, the dddressed reci- 
pient and unaddressed recipients are ratified participants to an encounter, while 
over-hearers (bystanders) and eavesdroppers are non-ratified listeners of other 
people's encounters.16 Which participant role a person is in provides a con- 
text for how this person is permitted to act. 
While Goffman's approach is restricted to the realm of what he calls the 
interaction order, other ethnogaphers and linguists (e.g., in the tradition of 
the ethnogmphy of communication) would include participants' interactional 
and social roles and the type of speech event (e.g., medical consultation, birth- 
day party, telephone enquiry) into a definition of the social situation as well. 
Interactional roles may be a function of the speech event; for instance, a medi- 
cal consultation requires participants to take over, at least temporarily, the roles 
of doctor and patient. Other (aspects of one's) social roles, which tend to be 
trans-situationally more stable and which are not eo +o bound to the type of 
speech event co-participants are engaged in, are social class, caste, ethnic affi- 
Iiation, gender or age. 
The fourth dimension of context -that of participants' common back- 
ground knowledge- is of complexity. Research on this dimension 
may be located in the tradition of phenomenological approaches to the struc- 
ture of the lifeworld, the essential structural principles of which have been 
outlined in Alfred Schütz' work;17 it has also been elaborated on in the tradi- 
tion of formal pragmatics and presupposition theory (Sperber and Wilson 
1986), and more recently, there have been attempts to formalize this know- 
ledge in artificial intelligence.18 
There is an obvious overlap with the previous dimensions. What has been 
mentioned before in a text may become an indexed feature of the co-text of a 
later utterance; at the same time, it is part of the situation-specific common 
16. Follow-up work on these distinctions can be found in Goodwin, Ch. (1984) , Goodwin, 
M.H. (1990) and Levinson (1988). 
17. See for example Schütz & Luckmann (1976). 
18. Reichman (1984), or Putnam (1988). 
From Context to Contextualizarion Links & Letters 3, 1996 19 
background knowledge participants may rely on in the production and inter- 
pretation of future activities. Similarly, social roles can only become visibly 
relevant for an interaction because their attributes, including rules of linguis- 
tic conduct, are part of participants' shared knowledge. Thus, underlining the 
knowledge aspect is sometimes just another perspective on context which focu- 
ses, not so much on objective facts as indexed objects, but rather on (inter) 
subjective interpretations and typifications. From this perspective, a useful dis- 
tinction is one that relies on the reach or domain (Gültigkeitsbereich) of a par- 
ticular piece of knowledge.19 Knowledge is accumulated between participants 
during a particular interactive episode; this very specific knowledge may be 
partly forgotten after the episode, or it may be partly transferred to a stock of 
knowledge which accumulates between these same participants in the course 
of their histo y of interaction. A larger Gültkkeitsbereich is involved when know- 
ledge which is characteristic to a certain profession (reflected, for instance, in 
a professional code or register), a neighbourhood, a sub-culture, becomes a rele- 
vant context of interaction. Finally, knowledge on how to behave properly 
within a given (ideal) community which is shared by al1 its members may be 
invoked for the understanding of afocal event. Here, we reach the maximal 
domain within which knowledge is shared among participants, (i.e., that of 
common culture). 
In the latter domain, looking at participants' background knowledge is not 
simply a different way of looking at the same indexed elements, but it covers 
an additional range of phenomena. The culture perspective is a central com- 
ponent of the FirthIHalliday tradition of linguistic research, but also of the 
ethno aphy of communication and other branches of anthr~polo~ical linguis- iY Attempts have been made to formalize restricted components of this 
knowledge, using notions of scberna, script, or &me. 
The final dimension of context is that of the channel or medium in which 
the interaction takes place. For many, including the Westem cultures, the tech- 
nology that has had the most impact on language is writing (see Ong 1982). 
The influence of modern or recent technologies -such as telephone, tele- 
gramme, e-mail, automatic answering machines- is only beginning to be 
investigated. 
19. See Kjolseth's distinction between background foreground emergentgroundc and transcen- 
dent groztndc (1972). 
20. Apart frorn earlier treatrnents in the Humboldtian tradition, it is once more Malinowski 
wLose ethnographic view oflanguage was a breakthrough towards the view on language that 
takes culture seriously. (He clairned that language is essentially rooted in the reality of the 
culture, the tribal life and custorns of a pe&le:and that it &nnot be explained without 
constant reference to these broader contexts of verbal utterance (Malinowski 1926:305).) 
See for exarnple Halliday and Hasan (1985) for an overview of this tradition; for anthro- 
pological approaches to cultural contexts see Geertz (1973). Irnportant contributions in 
rnodern linguistic anthropology towards a better understanding of cultural contexts and 
their relation to linguistic structure have derived from the interest in cross-cultural corn- 
rnunication, particularly in the work of J. Gurnperz (Gurnperz 1982, and Gurnperz (ed.) 
1982). 
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5. The nature of the contextual link: the notion of contextualization 
Enumerating types of contexts is more of an illustrative or heuristic endeavour 
than a theoretically rewarding or satisfying one. This is so because there is 
some justification in the claim that basically everything can become a con- 
text for a linguisticfocal event. The more interesting question surely is how this 
becoming-a-context-for-something is accomplished. It is precisely this question 
which has recently moved into the forefront of pragmatic thinking. 
Contrary to the narrow approach to context, recent theories see the rela- 
tionship benveen focal event and context as a reflexive, dialectic one. This means 
that it is not only thefocalevent that receives its adequate interpretation from 
a given context; it is also the indexicals which make relevant, invoke, actualize, 
and maintain contextual frames. The latter point is underlined in Gumperz' 
work on contextualization (Gumperz 1982, 1992a; 1992 b; Auer and Di 
Luzio, eds., 1992). Coparticipants, so Gumperz argues, not only engage in 
fitting their utterances into contexts existing prior to and independent from 
their verbal and non-verbal activities; a major task in making interaction work 
consists in additionally making these contexts jointly available through what 
he calls contextualization cues. Contrary to the unidirectional conceptualiza- 
tion of the textlcontext-link usually adopted in the narrow approach to context, 
this context is continually reshaped in time, in other words, language is not 
determined by context, but contributes itself in essential ways to the cons- 
truction of context. 
This implies that context is not given as such, but is regarded as the out- 
come of participants' joint efforts. It is not a collection of material or social 
facts (such as the interaction taking place in such-and-such locale, with such- 
and-such social roles), but a cognitive scheme (or model) about what is rele- 
vant for the interaction at any given point in time. This scheme may exclude 
or include certain facts of the material and social surroundings of the inte- 
raction as they might be stated by an objective on-looker who tries to describe 
context without looking at what takes place in it, but it may also include 
information not statable before the interaction begins, or independently of it 
(brought alongvs. brought about context features in Hinnenkamp's termino- 
logy; see IHinnenkamp 1989). These emergent context parameters refer to 
types of linguistic activities not predictable from the material or social 
environment of the interaction at all, but also to facets of knowledge which 
may in fact be shared by co-participants from the very beginning, but have 
to be turned from invisible (and interactionally irrelevant) dispositions 
(potentialities) into commonly available grounds on which to conduct the 
interaction. 
It is useful to distinguish between more and less contextualizing cue in- 
dexicals, or between relatively presupposing a n d  relatively creative ones 
(Silverstein 1976, 1979). A typical instance of the first kind would be local 
deictics (presupposing an object out there to which they refer), a typical ins- 
tance of the second kind inclusive vs. exclusive first person plural pronouns 
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(creating a grouping of participants which has no necessary counterpart in 
the world out there). It is a matter of debate if an indexical can be exclusively 
presupposing and completely uncreative; local deictics, for instance, surely 
also create (in addition to presupposing) an indexed object in drawing par- 
ticipants' attention to something, the presence of which they may not have 
been aware of before. 
Generally, this means that al1 contexts are grounded in interactional work. 
Methodol~gicall~, this groundedness of context in interactional work re- 
quires analysts to validate their claims to the relevance of contexts by showing 
that such interactional work has in fact been done. Contexts, then, are no 
@e gods  available to analysts in al1 sizes for the interpretation of a given 
text. 
Gumperz' pers ective on context draws on prior work in context analysis 
by Bateson (1956)' and onframes by Gofiman (1974), but substantiaily takes 
into account the fine-grained phenomena (prosody, gesture, choice of regis- 
ter, variety or style), which are the material basis of al1 processes of contex- 
tualization; in doing so, he goes beyond the more general description of 
(hierarchies of) frames, towards an empirical analysis of how these frames are 
made to work as contexts for actual linguistic utterances. Linguistic under- 
standing then consists of the semantic interpretation of lexico-grammatical 
structure together with the culture-bound interpretation of these contextual- 
ization cues, which are usually non-representational signs (see section 6 below). 
Nonetheless, his reflexive and interactionally grounded theory of context does 
not stand alone in linguistic and sociological theory. 
For instance, a constructivelconstructivist view of context is also advoca- 
ted in ethnomethodology, which may be seen to be, among other things, a 
re-assessment of sociological role theory. It aims at showing that social roles 
have to be made relevant in interaction in order to provide the context for 
interpretation. (A doctor is not a doctor because he or she holds a diploma 
and apatient isnt a patient because slhe has entered a doctor? ofice; but both 
become incumbents of the complementary roles of doctor and patient because 
of the way in which they interact, taking on the rights and obligations of 
the partners in this unequal relationship). Thus, although there may be a pre- 
existent repertoire of possible roles people can take over in a society, one (or 
more) of these roles must be actualized as soon as the interaction begins, and 
throughout it. What has been brought along in terms of social background 
now needs to be brought about as the now-relevant-context, and is therefore 
also subvertible: patient and doctor may become oldfiends or neighbours, and 
vice versa. 
21. This point has been made most rigorously by Schegloff (1987); see aiso Sacks (1976) and 
with reference to ethnicity as a context Moerman (1968). Divergent points of view have 
been stated in Labov and Fanshel (1977: 73, 30,352) and Oevermann et al. (1979). 
22. For a summary of this tradition of research and its importance for the anaiysis of non-ver- 
balcommunication, see chapter two in Kendon (1990). 
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A similar swing-over from a unidirectional, non-reflexive notion of con- 
text towards a dynamic, flexible one has taken place in certain parts of lin- 
guistic pragmatics. For instance, Chafe's dichotomy givenhew has replaced the 
older distinction between okdand new information. Whereas the oldlnew dis- 
tinction is an externa1 one, in which the status of information is seen quasi- 
objectively from the point of view of the observerllinguist, the givenlnew 
distinction takes the participants' point of view: it recognizes that even old 
(i.e., aforementioned, or general background) information has to be made 
available in order to be treated as given. Many so-called topicalizing structures 
in syntax do precisely that: they upgrade old information to given informa- 
tion; thereby they construe context (instead of being determined by it). Note 
that the givenlnew distinction, although primarily used in connection with 
co-textual or background information, applies to deixis as well. Even the spa- 
tio-temporal surroundings cannot be taken for granted. Many (or possibly all, 
depending on definition) uses of deictics are in fact topicalizing, (i.e., they 
refer to objects in the surroundings of the speaker and hearer which have always 
been there in a material sense, but are only turned into given objects of con- 
text by this particular type of reference). 
As a second example from pragmatic theory, Sperber and Wilson's (1986) 
theory of relevante sees context as a set of assumptions which have to be selec- , 
ted by the individual from a larger set of assumptions (on the perceived situa- 
tion, short-term memory and long-term memory, including the whole of 
encyclopaedic memory). As soon as such a set has been chosen, the processing 
of a new utterance (comprehension) can take place; but at the same time, con- 
text formation can be revised, (i.e., assumptions can be removed or added to 
it). Sperber and Wilson make a point similar to Gumperz', namely, that acti- 
vating a context involves an effort, just like the processing of information in this 
context. 
Since the mid-eighties, reflexive notions of context have also become inte- 
gated into artificial intelligence. For instance, Reichman (1984) sees discourse 
as a hierarchical organisation of so-called context-spaces which provide the 
necessary information for the processing of subsequent utterances. Participants, 
so she argues, generate and interpret utterances in the context of these con- 
text-spaces; but at the same time, they must be able to identify the relevant 
(focused) context at any given moment. It is not always the immediately pre- 
ceding context space which is relevant for a given utterance. Therefore, parti- 
cipants attribute focus to context spaces, omitting passages of discourse, or 
pointing back to distant ones, mainly by the choice of referential means. Thus, 
the selection of a relevant context space is as important as the processing of 
new information given in the light of it. 
6. The semiotic nature of contextualization cues 
As outlined in the last section, the notion of contextualization includes those 
verbal and nonverbal cues which contextualize language without being part 
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of p m m a r  or lexicon, (e.g., prosodic, stylistic or non-verbal cues). What are the 
properties that make these cues useful for steering the interpretation of what 
is going on? And how are they used in the process of inferencing which leads 
towards such an interpretation? 
First, it should be noted that cues rnay bundle together in time to varying 
degrees. There rnay be points in interaction where there is a dense synchroni- 
zation of contextualization cues on al1 levels, (i.e., there is redundancy) ; at 
other points, it rnay be a singular cue which re-contextualizes the situation at 
hand. 
In either case, contextualization cues in Gurnperz' sense do not have referen- 
tia1 (decontextualized) meaning of the kind we find in lexical entries. Thus, 
it is impossible to say what a high onset (in intonation), clapping hands, gaze 
aversion, code-switching into Italian mean as such. O n  the other hand, it is 
often possible to come to a plausible interpretation of what is going on in a 
given piece of interaction, only if exactly these contextualization cues are taken 
into account; there can be no doubt, therefore, that these cues are meaning- 
ful in some way or other, although no referential/decontextualized meaning 
can be attributed to them. 
The way in which this can be done is twofold. In the most simple case, 
contextualization cues establish contrasts and influence interpretation by punc- 
tuating the interaction by these contrasts. For instance, cues rnay oppose 
stretches of talk in a loud and in a low voice, in a high and in a low rate of 
articulation, with a wide and with a narrow pitch range, in language A and 
language B; they rnay oppose stretches of interaction during which two inte- 
ractants have eye contact and those in which they haven't, or those during 
which an interactant leans back and those in which he or she sits upright. The 
mere fact of (usually abruptly) changing one (or more than one) aspect of the 
interaction rnay be enough to prompt an inference about why such a thing 
happens. In this process of inferencing it is necessary to rely on information 
contained in the local context of the cue's occurrence. The only meaning the 
cue has is to indicate otherness (to paraphrase Jakob: on's famous definition of 
the phoneme). The direction of the change (from one prosodic packaging, or 
gesture, or body position, or language, to another) is irrelevant, and dictated 
by the specific state the signalling resource involved is in. (For example, when 
loudness is low, a process of inferencing can only be triggered by switching to 
loud) This first semiotic functioning of contextualization cues has been com- 
pared to a knot-in-the-handkerchief. 
But many contextualizations do more than that. They establish a contrast 
and thereby indicate that something new is going to come, but at the same 
time, they restrict the number of possible plausible inferences of what this 
might be. They rnay do so on the basis of an inherent meaning potential 
which gives the direction of an inferential process. Such a direction-giving is a 
good deal more than what a merely contrastively used cue can achieve in the 
interpretation process, (i.e., more than the knot-in-the-handkerchief use of 
contextualization cues). 
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Inherent meaningpotential may be conventionalized (arbitrary) or natural 
(non-arbitrary), or a mixture of both. An example for a purely conventionalized 
meaning potential, of contextualization cues is code-switching between lan- 
guages. In a given speech community, switching from language A into B may 
be meaningful not only because of the contrast established, but also because of 
the attitudes and values associated with these languages. These may differ from 
one community to the next, even when the same pair of languages is invol- 
ved, (e.g., switching from Italian into German evokes different associations in 
South Tyrol than it does in a West German migrant community). What is 
associated with a particular language in a repertoire is a matter of conventions 
only and therefore arbitrary. 
Many cues have a natural inherent meaning base, however. Natural here 
must be understood as having its basis in some universal requirement of human 
interaction, of the working of the human mind, or of the articulatory andlor 
auditory mechanisms involved in speech production and perception. Such 
natural cues do not have to be acquired by the child in and as part of a given 
culture; they are at the disposition of every human interactant. But although 
natural cues do not have to be acquired, they can be suppressed or given a 
counter-reading by convention. This convention, of course, has to be learned. 
An example is turn-final (and, by extension, sentence-final) intonation con- 
tour. There is a natural expectancy that the end of a speaker's contribution or 
of a syntactic unit should be marked by diminishing fundamental frequency.23 
This expectancy is based on an iconic-metaphorical relationship between bot- 
tom lrest ltermination. In fact, unit-final intonation contours are falling in 
many speech communities. However, it is well known that some varieties (such 
as Australian English, Tyneside English, Alemannic) have rising final contours, 
which are to be regarded as conventionalized suspensions of the natural corre- 
lation betvveen termination and falling contour. 
Another case of a natural contextualization cue which is frequently sup- 
pressed by convention is gaze. Given the fact that human interaction is multi- 
channeled, a natural expectation is that more intense (or focused), or even 
competitive 1 aggressive interaction should be accompanied by eye contact, 
and not by gaze aversion, for eye contact both enables a full monitoring of the 
other's non-verbal activities, and displays this monitoring (attention). This 
natural correlation is used for contextualization in Western communicative 
cultures; ir1 many other cultures (e.g., American Indian), however, verbal inte- 
raction must not be accompanied by frequent or permanent eye contact, even 
if it is an intense and highly focused one. 
Thus, by their very nature as indexicals, contextualization cues point to the 
contexts they invoke or identiSr; in PeirceS terms, they do so'by virtue of a 
relationship of contiguity. However, few indexicals are pure indices in PeirceS 
sense; usually, there is an admixture of symbolic elements (qua convention) 
or iconic elements (qua similarity). 
23. See Bolinger (1983). 
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7 .  Conclusion 
Contexualization refers to a conceptualization of the text 1 context-link which 
is capable of overcoming the limitations inherent in traditional linpistic think- 
ing about this topic; the new notion of context -as an emerging, interac- 
tionally grounded achievement- may even shed new light on deixis, the 
prototype of the old notion. Equally important, research on contextualization has 
made it possible to link the more technical analysis of micro-phenomena of 
behavioural form in areas such as phonetics (intonation, rhythm, loudness, 
and so on) and non-verbal communication (gesture, gaze, proxemics) to the 
hermeneutically inclined analysis of conversation and similar approaches to 
interaction. There is a substantive body of research on this link now (among 
others, the collection in Auer and Di Luzio 1992) which is growing steadily. 
Eventually, it may be able to advance our understanding of human commu- 
nication. 
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